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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

LEROY RAYMOND JACKSON,

:

Defendant/Appellant,

Case No.

890546-CA

Priority No.

2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of possession of a
controlled substance, a third degree felony, and possession of a
controlled substance, a class "B" misdemeanor, after a bench
trial in the Third Judicial District Court.

This Court has

jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court correctly found that

defendant was not seized within the meaning of the fourth
amendment when defendant voluntarily approached and initiated a
conversation with the officer who had stopped his patrol car
behind defendant's car in a parking lot.

[A trial court's

factual assessment underlying a decision to grant or deny a
motion to supress will not be disturbed on appeal unless the
trial court's findings are clearly erroneous. A "correction of

error" standard is applied to a trial court's conclusions of law.
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App.), cert.
granted, (Utah 1989).]
2.

Whether the trial court correctly found that a

reasonable person under the circumstances would still believe
that they were free to leave when the officer asked defendant for
identification.

[A trial court's findings are clearly erroneous

factual assessment underlying a decision to grant or deny a
motion to supress will not be disturbed on appeal unless the
trial court's findings are clearly erroneous. A "correction of
error" standard is applied to a trial court's conclusions of law.
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App.), cert.
granted, (Utah 1989).]
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
U.S. Const, amend IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990):
A peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has reasonable suspicion
to believe he has committed or is in the act
of committing or is attempting to commit ct
public offense and may demand his name,
address and an explanation of his actions.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Leroy Raymond Jackson, was convicted of
possession of a controlled substance, to wit:

cocaine, a third

degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)
(Supp. 1989) and possession of a controlled substance, to wit:
marijuana, a class M B M misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1989) after a bench trial on July
11, 1989, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy,
Judge, presiding (R. 41-42).

Judge Murphy sentenced defendant to

a term of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison on the
felony conviction and six months in the Salt Lake County Jail on
the misdemeanor conviction. Ixi. The prison term was stayed and
defendant was placed on probation on the condition that he serve
six months in the Salt Lake County Jail to run consecutively to
his jail term on the misdemeanor conviction. Id.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 24, 1989 at about 1:00 a.m., Officer Jed Hurst
of the Salt Lake City Police Department observed defendant's
vehicle travelling westbound on 1700 South at about Main Street
in Salt Lake City. (T. 2, 6).

Suspecting that defendant's

vehicle matched the description of a vehicle involved in a
robbery, Officer Hurst made a U-turn and began to follow
defendant's vehicle for the purpose of running a license plate
check (MS. 14-17).

After following defendant's vehicle for a

minute or less, defendant pulled into a parking lot adjacent to
the Fox Lady Bar (MS. 15, 23) (T. 8). Hurst was unable to run

The transcript of proceedings dated July 7, 1989, will be
referred to as "MS." e.g., (MS. 1). The transcript of
proceedings dated July 11, 1989, August 14, 1989, and October 2,
1989, will be referred to as "T." e.g., (T. 1).
-3-

the license plate check before defendant pulled into a parking
stall (MS. 17). Hurst did not attempt to signal defendant to
stop in any way (T. 8).
Defendant put his car in park, exited his vehicle, and
began to walk toward Hurst's car rather than towards the bar (MS.
18) (T. 9). At this time, Hurst's vehicle was still moving
through the parking lot (T. 9). Hurst stopped his vehicle
approximately one car length behind defendant's vehicle, exited
his vehicle, and walked toward defendant (MS. 18) (T. 9-10).
Hurst recognized defendant from a previous encounter
and recalled defendant's last name (MS. 18) (T. 17-19).

Hurst

asked defendant if he was Mr. Jackson (T. 17). Defendant
responded, "I am Mr. Jackson." (T. 17). Hurst ask€*d, "Do you
have some I.D.?" (MS. 24). Defendant offered a Checkmart I.D.
with his name and picture on it (T. 10). Because Hurst had often
found Checkmart I.D.'s to be false and because he had just
observed defendant driving a vehicle he asked, "Do you have a
driver's license?" (MS. 26). Defendant responded that he did not
(Ms. 26). Hurst asked, "Why don't you have a driver's license?"
(MS. 26). Defendant responded that it had been taken away (T.
11).
Hurst then asked defendant for a vehicle registration
(MS. 27) (T. 11). Defendant responded that he did not have a
vehicle registration because he had recently purchased the
vehicle.

Ijd. After running a license plate and driver's license

check, Hurst discovered that the license plate on defendant's
vehicle was stolen and defendant's driver's license had been

suspended (MS. 29) (T. 12). Hurst placed defendant under arrest
for possession of stolen property and driving on a suspended
license (MS. 30) (T. 13). A subsequent search of defendant's
person revealed two small tin foil bindles of cocaine and a
marijuana cigarette (T. 14, 34f 37).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A "seizure" occurs when a reasonable person in view of
all the circumstances believes he or she is not free to leave.
The trial court correctly concluded that defendant was not seized
when defendant exited his vehicle and began to approach the
officer before the officer had stopped his vehicle behind
defendant's vehicle.

The mere fact that the officer stopped his

vehicle behind defendant's unoccupied vehicle did not create a
seizure of defendant's person.

In view of all the circumstances,

the trial court reasonably found that defendant initiated the
police encounter and that he did so voluntarily.
The trial court also concluded correctly that defendant
was not seized when the officer asked defendant for
identification.

An officer may approach a citizen and pose

questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his or
her will.

The court properly found that under the circumstances

of the present case, a reasonable person would believe that he or
she was free to leave.

-5-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANT WAS NOT INITIALLY
SEIZED.
On appeal, defendant contends that he was illegally
2
seized without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

He

argues that a seizure of his person occurred when Officer Hurst
parked his patrol car behind defendant's vehicle in a parking
lot.

He requests this Court to reverse the trial court's refusal

to suppress the controlled substances found on his person
pursuant to a search incident to arrest.
This case turns on whether or not defendcint was
initially seized.

A "seizure" under the fourth amemdment occurs

when a reasonable person in view of all the circumstances
surrounding the incident believes he or she is not free to
leave.3

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).

Example of circumstances indicating a seizure are as follows:
(1) the threatening presence of several officers, (2) the display
of a weapon by an officer, (3) some physical touching of the
person of the citizen, or (4) the use of language or tone of
voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might
be compelled.

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (citing Terry v. Ohio,

2
Because defendant does not support his claim with separate
state constitutional analysis, this Court should consider
defendant's claim based solely on federal constitutional grounds.
State v. Williams, 773 P.2d 1368, 1372 n.12 (Utah 1989).
3
As this Court noted in State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 n.3
(Utah Ct. App. 1987), a majority of the United States Supreme
Court has been unable to agree on the precise paramters of when a
"seizure" occurs in a "stop and frisk" situation.

392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,
207 and n.6 (1979); 3 W LaFave, Search and Seizure 53-55 (1978)).
See also State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
As the Court explained in Mendenhall, the purpose of
the fourth amendment is not to prohibit all contact between the
police and the citizenry, but to prevent arbitrary and oppressive
intrusion by the police upon a citizen's liberty interests.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553-54.

Thus, not every street encounter

between a citizen and the police invokes constitutional
safeguards.

Id.

Nothing in the federal constitution Mprevent[s]

a policeman from addressing questions to anyone on the streets."
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 37 (White, J., concurring).

So long

as the person being questioned "remains free to disregard the
questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion upon that
person's liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution
require some particularized and objective justification."
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.
In Mendenhall, the defendant was approached by two
agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency in an airport terminal. Id.
at 547. The agents identified themselves and asked to see her
identification and airline ticket. JEd. at 547-48.

She gave them

her driver's license and airline ticket and answered several
brief questions. Icl. at 548. When asked, she agreed to accompany
the agents to an airport office where a body search was conducted
by a female police officer which revealed contraband. Id. at 54849.
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The district court denied the defendant's motion to
suppress, finding that the agents had specific and articulable
facts which justified a suspicion of criminal activity. Ld. at
549.

However, the opinion of the Supreme Court, authored by

Justice Stewart with Justice Rehnquist concurring, held that no
4
"seizure" occurred on the facts of the case.
3^d. at 555.
Reviewing the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the Court
noted that:

(1) the agents wore no uniforms; (2) the agents

displayed no weapons; (3) the agents did not summon the defendant
to their presence; and (4) the agents requested, but did not
demand, the defendant's identification and ticket, :id. at 555.
In sum, the Court stated that the defendant did not have any
objective reason to believe that she was not free to end the
conversation and proceed on her way. Id.
In reviewing a seizure issue on appeal, it is wellaccepted that the trial judge is in the best position to
determine the reasonableness of the conduct under the particular
facts of each case.

State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 86-87.

A

trial court's factual assessment underlying a decision to grant
or deny a motion to suppress will not be disturbed on appeal
unless the trial court's assessment is against the clear weight
of the evidence or the appellate court is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.

State v. Ashe,

Justice Powell filed a separate opinion concurring in part in
which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 560-66. Powell's opinion concluded that
the question of whether the defendant was "seized" need not be
reached since the agents had reasonable suspicion to detain her.
Id.

745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987).
P.2d 537, 539 (Utah 1990).

See also, State v. Menke, 787

However, the appellate court must

apply a correction of error standard in the application of the
law to the facts.

Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 87.

Applying fourth amendment standards to the facts of
this case, no illegal seizure occurred.

Prior to trial,

defendant moved to suppress the contraband on the basis that it
was the fruit of an illegal seizure of his person in violation of
his fourth amendment rights (R. 33-34).

At an evidentiary

hearing held on July 7, 1989, Officer Hurst testified that he was
following defendant's vehicle to run a license plate check
because of his suspicion that defendant's vehicle matched the
description of a vehicle involved in a robbery (MS. 14-16).
Hurst did not make any attempt to stop the vehicle (MS. 16).
Before a license plate check could be performed, defendant pulled
into a parking lot adjacent to the Foxy Lady Bar (MS. 15-16).
Hurst followed defendant's vehicle and waited in the driveway
while defendant maneuvered his vehicle into a parking stall (MS.
17).

Hurst remained in his vehicle because he was uncertain

whether defendant's vehicle was going to remain in the parking
lot (MS. 17-18).

After parking his vehicle, defendant exited and

began walking toward's Hurst's vehicle (MS. 18). Hurst then
stopped his vehicle behind defendant's vehicle, exited, and began
to walk towards defendant.

Id.

While Hurst admitted that a

fence blocked the front of defendant's vehicle, he testified that
he simply parked behind defendant's vehicle and not that he
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blocked defendant's vehicle (MS. 23-24).

No other witnesses

testified at the suppression hearing.
Based upon Hurst's testimony, Judge Murphy denied
defendant's motion to suppress.

Judge Murphy clearly explained

his ruling as follows:
THE COURT: All right. I am prepared to rule
on this at this time. At the time the
officer pulled in back of the automobile
there was no articulable suspicion of
criminal activity on defendant's part. There
was, however, at that time no stop. The
officer was free to pull up where he wished
in the parking lot. It is true that the
defendant could not pull the car away.
However, the defendant was free to walk
wherever he wanted. He chose instead,
voluntarily, of walking on either side of the
car to walk to the bar, he chose to approach
the officer. The officer then engaged him in
conversation, asking for identification.
Still no stop.
The defendant voluntarily provided
information. As the defendant responds to
questions at the time which he [had] not been
stopped and not detained, then the officer's
suspicions are aroused by defendant's failure
to have a drivers license while he was
clearly just momentarily before driving, and
the defendant being unable to produce a
registration for the vehicle in which he was
driving. At that point the officer did have
an articulable suspicion of criminal activity
in that the defendant was driving a vehicle
without a license and was unable to produce
information indicating his right to be in the
vehicle and have possession of it. The stop,
then, occurs at that time and the officer had
an articulable suspicion of criminal
activity, and it was from that that the
substance which at least to this point the
court only knows to be a white substance, was
collected from the vehicle and that substance
will not be suppressed.
(MS. 48-50).

In sum, Judge Murphy found that defendant was on

foot and voluntarily chose to approach Hurst.

He rejected

defendant's claim that defendant was personally seized when Hurst
stopped his vehicle behind defendant's unoccupied vehicle.
Because no seizure occurred, no constitutional protections were
invoked.
Applying the Mendenhall circumstances test, there is
nothing in the record to indicate a seizure.

First, there was no

threatening presence of multiple police officers.
was no display of a weapon by an officer.

Second, there

Third, there was no

physical contact between defendant and the officer.

Finally,

there was no indication that compliance with the officer's
request would be compelled.

In fact, Hurst made no request

verbally or otherwise that defendant stop, approach, or answer
questions.

Thus, Judge Murphy's findings of fact at the pretrial

motion to suppress are not against the clear weight of the
evidence.
At trial, defendant renewed his motion to suppress on
the same grounds.

Hurst further testified that he did not

attempt to stop defendant and that defendant was free to walk
away after exiting his vehicle (T. 8-9, 12). Hurst believed that
defendant was approaching him because defendant desired to speak
with him (T. 25-26).

Had defendant simply walked toward the bar,

Hurst stated that he would have asked defendant if he would talk
to him (T. 26). If defendant had re-entered his vehicle and
attempted to leave, Hurst testified that he would probably have
allowed defendant to leave since he had no reason to stop
defendant (T. 27). However, Hurst stated that he would have
demanded a driver's license had defendant simply walked away
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after producing only a Checkmart I.D.

5

Id.

Based upon this additional testimony, Judge Murphy
again denied defendant's motion to suppress.

Judge Murphy ruled

as follows:
I think it's appropriate in connection with
the renewal of the motion to suppress that I
make specific findings on that, and therefore
I do find there is no articulable suspicion
to stop the defendant prior to the time that
the officer indicated that he had placed the
defendant under arrest.
The officer, Officer Hurst, admitted as
much on cross examination, and the court so
finds.
The court further finds that defendant
exited his car and approached the police car
on foot before the police car stopped. It
was thus the defendants [sic] voluntary act
that caused the encounter between the
defendant Mr. Jackson and Officer Hurst, not
the officer's conduct.
The police officer, upon stopping,
however, did block the automobile, and for me
to find otherwise, frankly, would be
intellectually dishonest.

Upon the encounter initiated by the
defendant, the police officer engaged the
defendant in no conversation except that of
seeking identification. It was reasonable
that the police officer would expect an
identification initially in the form of a
drivers license, and therefore, it was
reasonable for him to ask for a drivers
license, given his problems with Checkmart
identifications.

5
The officer's state of mind is not relevant in determining
whether a reasonable person would believe that he or she is free
to leave except insofar as the officer's overt actions
communicate that state of mind. People v. Ross, 217 Cal.App.3d
879, 217 Cal.Rptr. 921, 923 (Cal.Ct.App. 1990).

Up to that point there had been no stop
and no invocation of the Fourth Amendment,
because a reasonable person in the
defendant's position, considering the conduct
of Officer Hurst, would have believed he was
still free to leave. Upon defendant's
statement that he had no drivers license, a
reasonable suspicion arose that a crime or
infraction had been committed, that is,
driving without a license, and the defendant
had committed that crime or infraction.
And therefore, at that time there was a
basis for a stop under the Terry case, and
only thereafter did a stop occur. I think
it's important to consider those facts in
connection with the case law that has been
presented to me.
(T. 51-53).

Having made these findings, Judge Murphy proceeded

to discuss the case law cited by defendant (T. 53). In general,
Judge Murphy distinguished defendant's cases on the facts by
pointing out that defendant, unlike the cases cited by defendant,
was not in his vehicle and had initiated the encounter by
approaching Hurst's vehicle before it had stopped (T. 53-55).
Given Judge Murphy's finding of fact that defendant
voluntarily initiated the encounter as a pedestrian, defendant
fails to come forward with any factually similar case law which
reaches a different result applying fourth amendment legal
standards.

This Court should not reverse Judge Murphy's legal

conclusions where the record indicates that he correctly applied

Defendant cites the following cases: State v. Smith, 781 P.2d
879 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (officer stopped defendant's vehicle for
traffic violation by blocking defendant's car in parking lot;
defendant in vehicle when stopped); United States v. Kerr, 817
F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1989) (officer stopped defendant's vehicle by
blocking one lane driveway as defendant was backing out); People
v. Guy, 121 Mich.App. 592, 329 N.W.2d 435 (1982) (officer
initiated encounter by partially blocking driveway and
approaching vehicle).
-13-

the proper legal standards to the facts of the case*

Neither

should this Court upset Judge Murphy's factual findings where
they are based upon the clear weight of the evidence consisting
solely of the officer's testimony.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
DEFENDANT WAS NOT SEIZED WHEN THE OFFICER
ASKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.
Defendant argues that assuming he was not seized when
the officer blocked his car, he was seized when the officer asked
defendant for identification.

He claims that the trial court

clearly erred in finding that he was not seized when asked for
identification.

Defendant's claim should be rejected.

As stated above, the test for determining whether a
person was seized is an objective test which considers whether a
reasonable person under the circumstances would believe he or she
is free to leave.

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554. A trial court's

factual findings in this regard will not be disturbed unless they
are clearly erroneous.

State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah

1987) "Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the
factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous."
United States v. Carrasco, 887 F.2d 794, 819 (7th Cir. 1989).
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d
616 (Utah 1987), described the three levels of police encounters
with the public which are constitutionally permissible:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen
at anytime [sic] and pose questions
so long as the citizen is not
detained against his will; (2) an
officer may seize a person if the
officer has an "articulable

suspicion" that the person has
committed or is about to commit a
crime, however, the "detention must
be temporary and last no longer than
is necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer
may arrest a suspect if the officer
has probable cause to believe an
offense has been committed or is
being committed.
Ld. at 617-18 (quoting United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223,
230 (5th Cir. 1984).

Relating these three levels of encounters

to the facts in Deitman, the Court concluded that the police
encounter was a level one encounter.

Ixi. at 618. The Court

found that 'the police were justified in asking defendants for
identification and an explanation of their presence in an area
where police had responded to a burglar alarm."

Ijd. The Court

also found that the defendants were not detained against their
will.

Id.
The Court distinguished the facts in Deitman from State

v. Swaniqan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985), and State v. Carpena, 714
P.2d 674 (Utah 1986), in which the defendants were stopped,
detained, and searched without their consent.
at 618.

Deitman, 739 P.2d

In contrast, the defendants in Deitman were not "stopped

by the officer and raised no objection when the officer asked if
he could talk to them."

^d.

The defendants "crossed the street,

produced identification on request, and were not detained against
their will."

Id.

Likewise, defendant in the present case was not
stopped, detained, or compelled to produce identification against
his will.

Hurst testified that he recognized defendant from a
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previous encounter and could recall defendant's last name (MS.
18) (T. 17-19).
17).

Hurst asked defendant if he was Mr. Jackson (T.

Defendant responded, "I am Mr. Jackson" (T. 17). Hurst

asked, "Do you have some I.D.?" (MS. 24). Defendant offered a
Checkmart I.D. with his name and picture on it (T. 10). Because
Hurst had often found Checkmart i.D.'s to be false and because he
had just observed defendant driving a vehicle he asked, "Do you
have a driver's license?" (MS. 26). Defendant responded that he
did not (Ms. 26). Hurst asked, "Why don't you have a driver's
license?" (MS. 26). Defendant responded that it had been taken
away (T. 11).
Judge Murphy specifically found that Hurst's request
for identification was reasonable and that a reasonable person in
defendant's position "would have believed he was still free to
leave."

(T. 52). Other than the previously discussed vehicle

blocking, defendant fails to assert the existence of any
circumstance which would indicate that defendant was being
detained and compelled to produce identification.

Officer

Hurst's request for identification was clear and precise without
any indication that compliance was mandatory.

Presuming that the

position of Hurst's vehicle did not create a seizure, the
subsequent request for identification without more did not
elevate the situation into a level two encounter requiring
reasonable suspicion.
Defendant further claims that Hurst's request for
identification was unreasonable since Hurst recalled defendant's
last name.

He also claims that it was unreasonable to ask for a

driver's license after defendant had produced a Checkmart I.D.
Judge Murphy rejected these claims and found that it was
reasonable for Officer Hurst to ask for a driver's license as
identification given Hurst's prior difficulties with the validity
of Checkmart identifications (T. 52). Logically, the type of
identification requested should not alter the voluntary nature of
the police encounter.
Defendant cites several cases in support of his claim
that he was detained without articulable facts supporting
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

While these cases are

helpful in explaining fourth amendment standards, they are easily
distinguishable on their facts.
In Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 49 (1979), the
defendant was arrested after refusing to give his name and
address to police officers.

The officers had no articulable

suspicion that the defendant was involved in any specific
criminal misconduct.

In contrast, defendant in the present case

was not detained, was not compelled to produce identification,
and was not arrested for failing to produce identification.
In State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), the
officer exceeded the lawful scope of a traffic stop when he
opened the passenger door of the stopped vehicle.

3^d* at 1137.

In the instant case, defendant was not detained and therefore
Hurst could not have exceeded the scope of the detention.
Finally, defendant argues in Point III of his brief
that there was "no immediate need for an investigation."
Brief of App. at 27-32.)

(See

He asserts that Hurst had no reasonable
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suspicion of criminal activity to justify an investigative
detention.

Because no fourth amendment detention occurred, it is

unnecessary for the State to justify a detention.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
this Court to affirm defendant's convictions.
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